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In this paper we give an example in which the price of tradeable emission permits increases 
despite firms' adoption of a less polluting technology. This is in contrast with Montero (2002) and 
Parry (1998), among others. If two Counot players switch to a cleaner technology, the price for 
permits may increase due to an increase in the net demand for permits and a decrease in net 
supply of permits after the clean technology is adopted. This is only the case when output demand 
is elastic. 
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Hereafter we analyze the change in tradable emission permit prices due to the
adoption of a cleaner production technology when there are two Cournot competi-
tors in the output market. This paper relates to the literature on environmental
innovation. This literature￿ s conclusions are generally based on the argument that
environmental innovation produces a decrease in permit prices. Moreover, this
literature generally neglects the interaction between the tradable permits market
and the output market, or only a single monopoly ￿rm is considered whereas our
results are due to strategic interaction in the output market. Dowing and White
(1986), Milliman and Prince (1989), Tietenberg (1985) and Wenders (1975) show
that market-based instruments such as tradable permits provide higher incentives to
invest in environmental innovation than command-and-control instruments. More
recently, other authors like Parry (1998) and Requate (1998) have explicitly intro-
duced a competitive output market in their analysis. To the best of our knowledge,
only Montero (2002) considers the impact of strategic interaction in the output
market on incentives for environmental innovation and ￿nds that investment in a
clean technology produces a decrease in the tradable permit price that has, on the
one hand, a direct e⁄ect on the innovator￿ s pro￿ts (positive or negative, depending
on whether the ￿rms is a buyer or a seller of permits) and, on the other hand, an
indirect e⁄ect due to the decrease in production costs which allows the innovator
and his rival to increase output. Then, incentives to innovate depend on the net
e⁄ect. In fact, one expects the buyer of permits to decrease his demand (or the
seller of permits to increase his supply) after implementing a cleaner technology.
This is the case because with the clean technology ￿rms are able to produce the
same amount of output they were producing with the dirty technology but using
less permits. The seller would have a larger number of permits available, increasing
permits supply and the demander would buy less permits.
Instead, we identify when it is the case that the price of permits increases after
the adoption of a cleaner technology. In our model two symmetric Cournot com-
petitors in the output market can produce using either a clean or a dirty technology
taking the price of the input (permits) as given. This last assumption is also present
in Malueg (1989) and (1990), Sartzetakis (1997a) and (1997b) and is inspired on
the fact that ￿rms trading in a region-wide market for emission permits operate in
di⁄erent local markets, making each single ￿rms￿in￿ uence in the region-wide mar-
ket very low. As in BrØchet and Jouvet (2008) we de￿ne the clean technology as a
technology that has a lower degree of pollution intensity per unit of output than the
dirty one. This means that the clean technology is less intense in emissions per unit
of output. In this context, we show that previous literature￿ s intuition regarding
a fall in the permits price after the implementation of a clean technology is true
when output demand is inelastic. Instead, when the cap on emissions is binding
and/or the decrease in the polluting intensity of output after the implementation
of the clean technology is low enough, the price of permits may increase with the
implementation of a clean technology. In particular, this is the case when output
demand elasticity is enough high to induce ￿rms to use the increase in e¢ ciency
due to the implementation of the clean technology to increase output production.
When this is the case the Cournot equilibrium after the implementation of the clean
technology as opposed to the dirty one is realized for a higher demand and lower
supply of permits. These push the price of permits upwards.
Our results are in line with Malueg (1989) and (1990) in the sense that the
1link between markets is due to the fact that permits price re￿ ects in the cost of
output production. Given the technology used by each ￿rm and the corresponding
marginal input (permits) productivity, the permits price is both the unit cost (or
revenue) of trading permits and the unit cost of output production.
2. THE MODEL
Assume that two symmetric ￿rms (i;j) competing ￿ la Cournot are producing
an homogenous good and face a linear output demand, i.e. p(yi +yj) = 1￿yi ￿yj:
Production of good y generates emissions e as a by-product with an intensity k.
We assume a linear production function y = ke where the polluting intensity of
output is k = 1 in the case of the dirty technology and k > 1 in the case of the
clean technology. Firms are subject to environmental regulation that establishes a
binding cap S on total emissions and requires ￿rms to hold permits for the exact
amount of pollution emitted. A fraction ￿ of total permits S is allocated for free
to ￿rm i and a fraction (1 ￿ ￿) to ￿rm j. The total amount of permits available
S and the fractions ￿ and (1 ￿ ￿) are common knowledge. We assume that ￿rms
comply with the environmental regulation, hence, emission levels and use of permits
coincide. If the amount of permits received for free is di⁄erent from the optimal
amount of permits needed for output production, ￿rms engage in permits trading.
Finally, we assume that the parameters of the model satisfy k ￿ 2 and k￿1
2k￿1 ￿
Sk ￿ 2
3: These conditions guarantee that both ￿rms make non-negative pro￿ts in
any possible outcome1. It is worth noting that the domain fk;Sg satisfying these
restrictions is non-empty.
2.1. Using the dirty technology
Taking the price of permits as given, ￿rms maximize pro￿ts given by:
￿i ￿
yi;yj￿
= (1 ￿ yi ￿ yj)yi ￿ r(ei ￿ ￿S);
￿j ￿
yi;yj￿
= (1 ￿ yi ￿ yj)yj ￿ r(ej ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)S);
where r is the price for permits and (ei ￿ ￿S) and (ej ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)S) represent the
amount of permits exchanged in the market for permits for each ￿rm respectively.
If for instance ￿ 2 (0; 1
2); then ei ￿ ￿S represents the demand for permits.
Output market equilibrium
Given the fact that both ￿rms are using the dirty technology, pro￿t of ￿rm i
can be expressed as
￿i(ei;ej) = (1 ￿ ei ￿ ej)ei ￿ r(ei ￿ ￿S): (1)
Similarly, pro￿t for ￿rm j is
￿j(ei;ej) = (1 ￿ ei ￿ ej)ej ￿ r(ej ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)S): (2)
After computing the ￿rst order conditions and solving the system of equations we








1The condition k ￿ 2 is necessary for the existence of equilibrium in the permits market. This
condition yields a positively sloped supply of permits. Secondly, we will see that equilibrium
price of permits is non-negative if Sk 6 2
3 while equilibrium levels of emissions are non-negative
if Sk > k￿1
2k￿1.
2Permits￿market equilibrium
Firms claim their position as a buyer or seller of permits, given their output
production choice. Notice that we assume that ￿rms do not take into account that
r is a function of ei + ej when maximizing pro￿ts in the output market. This
is compatible with a market for permits with participants from many sectors and
countries such that these ￿rms are price-takers in the permits market.
Firms will buy or sell the di⁄erence between their production needs summarized
in (3), and the permits they received for free, ￿S or (1 ￿ ￿)S respectively. If for
instance ￿ 2 (1
2;1), ￿rm i is a supplier of permits and total supply is ￿S￿ 1￿r
3 , while
total demand of permits is 1￿r
3 ￿(1￿￿)S. Then, the clearing market condition in
the market for permits yields the equilibrium price r￿:









Then, we ￿nd the optimal level of ￿rms output as:




2.2. Using the clean technology
The analytical solution for this symmetric Cournot case is the same as the
previous one. The di⁄erence is that now both ￿rms use the clean technology and
therefore maximize respectively:
￿i(ei;ej) = (1 ￿ kei ￿ kej)kei ￿ r(ei ￿ ￿S);
￿j(ei;ej) = (1 ￿ kei ￿ kej)kej ￿ r(ej ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)S):




3k2 ; where the c stands
for clean, and which gives the equilibrium price in the permits market2:
r￿




Consequently, when both ￿rms innovate e￿i
c = S
2 = e￿j
c : And the optimal output







Then, the symmetric Cournot equilibrium is now realized for a higher output pro-
duction with respect to production with the dirty technology. The following propo-
sition states what happens with permit prices.
Proposition 1. When both ￿rms use the clean technology as opposed to the
dirty one, the price for permits r￿
c increases if the decrease in the polluting intensity
of output k is lower than the threshold value k < 2
3S ￿ 1: This thresholds implies
that output demand is not inelastic.
2Even if ￿rms are price takers in the permits market, the price of permits changes due to the
change in the marginal productivity of emissions with the clean technology.
3Proof. By direct comparison of permits prices in (4) and (7) we ￿nd that the
di⁄erence is positive, i.e. r￿
c ￿ r￿
1 > 0; if k < 2
3S ￿ 1.










Figure 1: Area where the price of permits increases.
Let us use Figure 2.2 to understand the intuition behind our proposition. Permit
prices increase after innovation for the pairs fk;Sg that satisfy k < 2
3S ￿1, i.e. that
are in the area to the left of the thick line in Figure 2.2. On the other hand, output
demand is elastic for the pairs fk;Sg that satisfy k < 1
2S; i.e. that belong to the
area to the left of the thin line in Figure 2.2. This result may seem counterintuitive.
In fact, one expects the buyer of permits to decrease his demand (or the seller of
permits to increase his supply) after implementing the clean technology. Firms
could produce the same amount of output they were producing with the dirty
technology but using less permits. The seller would have a larger number of permits
available, increasing permits supply and the demander would buy less permits. This
is what happens in the area to the right of the thin line in Figure 2.2 because in
this area output demand is inelastic and ￿rms have no incentives to use the new
technology to increase output production.
But when ￿rms switch to the clean technology, the new symmetric Cournot
equilibrium may be such that both ￿rms want to increase their output produc-
tion proportionally to the increase in e¢ ciency due to the utilization of the clean
technology. Then, the gap of permits of the buyer (say ￿rm i) with the dirty tech-
nology, namely e￿i￿￿S, becomes even larger when the buyer switches technologies,
e￿i
c ￿ ￿S: For the same reason, the positive gap of the seller of permits with the
clean technology, e￿j
c ￿(1￿￿)S; is smaller than the corresponding gap e￿j￿(1￿￿)S
with the dirty technology. Thus, in this case, the demand for permits increases and
supply of permits decreases. This is veri￿ed for the pairs fk;Sg to the left of the
thick line in Figure 2.2: output demand elasticity is so high that ￿rms have big
incentives to increase output production even if this generates a pressure on permit
prices that produces an increase in their production costs. To this end, all the
increase in production e¢ ciency due to the implementation of the clean technology
is used to increase output production ending up with a permits equilibrium price
higher than when the dirty technology was in use.
For the pairs fk;Sg that are between the two curves in Figure 2.2, output de-
mand is elastic but the price of permits decreases when implementing the clean
technology. This is the case because in that area elasticity is not so high and there-
fore the increase in ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts coming from the output market when increasing
production would not be enough to compensate an increase in the price of permits
(i.e. their production costs). Then, ￿rms will use part of their extra permits due
to the implementation of the clean technology to increase production and another
part to decrease their need of permits in the permits market (decrease demand or
increase supply). To this end the price of permits decreases after innovation.
4The previous result underlines the importance of output demand characteristics
and its in￿ uence in the input (permits) market outcome. Moreover, it establishes
the e⁄ect on permit prices of the interaction between the decrease in the pollut-
ing intensity of output due to the implementation of a cleaner technology k; the
characteristics of output demand and our policy variable: the cap on emissions S:
3. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In contrast to previous literature results, we have given an example in which
the price of tradeable emission permits increases after ￿rms adoption of a clean
technology. In particular, we show that, if two Counot players switch from a dirty
to a clean production technology, the price for permits may increase due to an
increase in the net demand for permits and a decrease in the net supply of permits.
This is the case when the cap on emissions is binding and/or the decrease in the
polluting intensity of output after implementing the clean technology is low enough.
In particular, these conditions are only realized when output demand is elastic.
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